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"If the A N C leadership wants to win mass support it may be 
better advised to work on the Zion Christian Church 
hierarchy than to dismiss this enormous group as a relic of 
political underdevelopment."1 
Introduction 
On Easter Sunday, Apr i l 7, 1985, State President P.W. Botha 
addressed a crowd of over two million black South Africans at 
the headquarters of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), which was 
then celebrating its 75th anniversary.2 The festivities took place 
at Zion City, Moria, about forty-eight kilometres from 
Pietersburg in the Northern Transvaal. The presidential couple 
arrived by helicopter and the head of the church, the Right 
Reverend Bishop Barnabas Lekganyane, went to the landing pad in 
an extra-long American limousine to greet his visitors. The 
President was given an opportunity to address the congregation, 
and Bishop Lekganyane presented him with a scroll conferring on 
him the first-ever honorary citizenship of Moria, "in appreciation 
of his efforts to spread peace and love, and to prove the high 
esteem in which he is held". The President returned the 
compliment by giving the bishop a leather-bound Afrikaans Bible. 
In his speech, which was frequently interrupted by applause, 
Botha warned his audience against "the powers of darkness and 
the messengers of evil", terms which were interpreted by sections 
of the press as referring to the African National Congress and 
its supposed communist supporters (The Times, Apr i l 8, 1985). 
Citing St. Paul's Letter to the Romans, he declared, 
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every man is subject to civi l authorities. There is no 
authority except that which is willed by God. Good behaviour 
is not afraid of magistrates; only wrongdoers have anything 
to fear. If man lives honestly, authority wil l approve of him. 
The state is there to serve God for your own benefit. 
Coming in the wake of the Uitenhage shooting and countrywide 
civi l unrest, with the attendant international outrage, the chance 
to be seen addressing such a massive gathering of Africans 
provided Botha a heaven-sent opportunity to recoup some lost 
political ground and to ensure the neutrality of Z C C members in 
defiant townships. The latter point was alluded to by Bishop 
Lekganyane, who preaching after I Corinthians 13, said that love 
and not violence was the key to the solution of all problems: "We 
have love and this has enabled our church to take the word of 
God to so many people".3 
The event was widely covered by the mass media, both nationally 
and internationally. Reports of the event impressed even the New 
York Times (April 8, 1985), which gave it front-page coverage. 
Most expressed surprise at the warm reception which Botha 
received at Moria, but there was cynical comment as well. Thus 
Sowetan (April 12, 1985) noted that, while the South African 
government was in the habit of accusing church leaders such as 
Tutu and Boesak of meddling in politics, the man at its helm was 
apparently free to address a church gathering on a political 
subject. The paper further noted that Botha's "political 
pilgrimage" to Moria City had caused considerable anger among 
organisations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) , 
Azania's People's Organisation (AZAPO) , Azanian Students' 
Movement ( A Z A S M ) , the African National Congress (ANC) , and 
the South African Council of Churches (SACC). The UDF ' s 
publicity secretary, Patrick Lekota, observed that President 
Botha's visit was calculated to undercut the growing resistance to 
apartheid, and A Z A P O ' s Imram Moosa spoke of a "gigantic fraud". 
Dr Beyers Naudé, general secretary of the S A C C , for his part 
reminded the public that this was not an isolated case, but that 
the government had been trying to build up good relationships 
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with the Z C C over a number of years.4 Although Botha was the 
highest ranking, he was not the first government official to pay 
a visit to the ZCC's Easter celebration. Daan de Wet Nel, 
minister of Bantu Administration and Development, had preceded 
him in 1960, and in 1980, on the occasion of its seventieth 
anniversary, the church's leadership had invited such political 
figures as "Mayor" David Thebehali, chairman of the Soweto 
Community Council, Cedric Phatudi, Chief Minister of Lebowa, 
and Piet Koornhof, minister of co-operation and development. 
Bishop Lekganyane had on that occasion called on his followers 
to support the government's homeland policy and to abide by the 
laws of the country. That speech too had been sharply criticised 
by African churchmen and political leaders, but the Z C C 
leadership apparently had feit confident enough to ignore such 
criticism. 
Yet, despite the numerous commentaries that appeared in the 
press after the 1985 Easter celebration, few gave a satisfactory 
explanation of this unusual event. According to Sowetan the 
applause so generously given Botha could only be explained, i f it 
was remembered that the majority of the Z C C adherents were 
either "semi-literate or illiterate". Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace 
Prize winner and Anglican bishop of Johannesburg, expressing his 
shock at the applause of the Z C C members after almost every 
sentence of M r Botha's speech, could only say that it looked "as 
if someone was directing them" and "as i f they were programmed" 
{Sowetan, Apr i l 12, 1985; Sunday Tribune, Apr i l 14, 1985). The 
Times (April 9, 1985) seemed more to the point when it suggested 
that the popularity of the Z C C and the massively attended 1985 
Easter celebration should be viewed as an answer to the violent 
anti-government demonstrations in the black townships. The 
Christian Science Monitor (April 12, 1985) concurred by pointing 
out that the ZCC's support for the government was of obvious 
relevance to the crisis facing Botha as the black rebellion in the 
townships continued to simmer. At the very least, Z C C support 
for the government guaranteed the neutrality of its numerous 
followers in the black townships, where the young and 
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unemployed had become increasingly defiant of authority. David 
Breier, political correspondent of the Sunday Tribune, added a 
further dimension by emphasising that the attitude of Bishop 
Lekganyane and his church was diametrically opposed to that of 
such "turbulent priests" as Boesak and Tutu (Sunday Tribune, 
Apr i l 14, 1985). Where the latter in the eyes of the government 
directly or indirectly seemed to provide religious legitimation for 
the use of violence, the Z C C challenged such legitimation in no 
uncertain terms. This was not a novel viewpoint for, when Bishop 
Lekganyane visited Soweto in 1981 at the invitation of "Mayor" 
Tebehali, the latter said at a rally that the bishop was the only 
person who could save the township from hatred, killings and 
gossip. 
Speaking out against violence can be done without giving 
one's blessing to the apartheid system, which is what the bishop's 
words and deeds at the 1985 Easter celebration amounted to in 
the eyes of many. Why did the Z C C go that far? None of the 
commentators answered that question. Yet, the answer had been 
suggested almost forty years earlier in the Sunday Tribune (18 
December 1949). In an article entitled "Zulu Zionist Danger in 
Union" and published under a nom de plume, the author made the 
crucial observation that "African Zionism" was an African 
apartheid system, and the rapid growth of that movement should 
be a matter of concern for all those who looked to interracial 
co-operation as the ultimate solution for race relations within 
South Africa. It is this interpretation that we want to pursue in 
the next section. 
Origin and growth of the South African Zion movement 
The Z C C forms part of a religious movement, which originated 
around the turn of the century out of an American revivalist 
body known as the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Z ion . 5 
Members of this church brought their strong pentecostal message 
out to South Africa, where Zulu converts subsequently formed 
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their own churches. Since then, they have increased to the 
extent that their number is now estimated at around 3.500 in the 
Republic alone, with an overall membership of some six million, 
or thirty percent of the African population.6 
Most of these churches are rather small, counting from a few 
hundred to a few thousand members. This is mainly due to their 
organisational structure, which offers little defence against 
schismatic movements occurring with a certain regularity. There 
are a few exceptions, though, including the Z C C and the 
intensely nationalistic Nazareth Baptist Church, described by one 
of its members as the "Zulu High Church." 7 
Although it is not possible to obtain précise membership 
figures, there need be no doubt that the Z C C is by far the 
largest Zion church in the whole of southern Africa. According 
to the population census of 1980 the Z C C had then a membership 
of 769.000, amounting to 4,5% of the black population. 8 Bishop 
Lekganyane himself estimated in 1985 that the church counted 
around 4,5 million members spread over South Africa, Zimbabwe. 
Swaziland and Malawi. 9 
The Z C C differs from most other Zionist churches in that it 
is "pan-ethnic" in the sense that it recruits across cultural and 
linguistic boundaries, although more or less exclusively among 
Africans. There are a dozen or so Z C C followers of European and 
Asian descent, but the character of the Z C C is and has always 
been emphatically African. 
Most commentators agree that one of the main reasons why 
the Zion churches exercise such a great attraction is that they 
put great emphasis on ritual healing or prayer healing. It is 
probably true and no exaggeration to say that most people join 
these churches in the course of seeking a cure for some ailment 
or other. Zionist healing differs from that of the traditional 
ngaka (medicine person) in that it relies less on magie substances 
and is therefore thought to be less tainted by witchcraft. It 
differs from modern medicine in that it attributes the occurrence 
of disease (and other forms of human misfortune) to the 
activities of witches or spirits, and to the neglect of certain 
taboos by the patient or someone near to him or her. 1 0 
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Unlike medical practitioners in the western tradition, healing 
prophets in Zion churches take such beliefs seriously. They are 
thus able to free patients of some of their fears and by so doing 
contribute to the healing process. A n important element in that 
process is the feeling on the part of the patient that he or she 
now belongs to a community. As Adam and Moodley put it, these 
"rituals of healing place the needy in a circle of touching, caring 
fellows and make up for the lack of costly western medicine". 1 1 
The fact that Zion churches are much more numerous in 
South Africa than in other subsaharan countries suggests 
furthermore that they function as instruments of protest or 
resistance against white domination, and that this is to be 
regarded as another reason for their popularity. Indeed this has 
been the dominant view in the social sciences after World War II, 
when these and other "prophetic movements" became a popular 
subject of investigation. However, that view was challenged in 
later years, when most African countries became politically 
independent. The expectation had been that under an African 
government these churches would lose some of their appeal, but 
the opposite seems to have taken place, for, i f anything, their 
following kept growing. Moreover, it became clear also that Zion 
churches were, politically speaking, very much on the conserva-
tive side. Their leaders might occasionally preach against 
injustices perpetrated by the colonial or post-colonial state, but 
they seldom engaged in political activism. In the words of James 
Kiernan, one of the experts on South African Zion churches, 
these gentle, peace-loving people are not engaged in a 
crusade of social reform. They are not intent on moving the 
earth by social upheaval. Nor are they the least interested in 
bringing about political change. At one time the Ethiopian 
churches (i.e. western-type African churches; M.S.) aligned 
themselves with the aims of African nationalism but Zionists 
have never espoused any political cause.1 2 
This political conservatism the Zion churches have in common 
with healing movements everywhere, which seem so preoccupied 
with the micro-world of the suffering individual that they tend 
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to lose sight of the macro-structures which cause those 
sufferings. 1 3 On the other hand, the Zion churches can be 
justifiably described as a protest movement. Only, the type of 
Protest which they represent is cultural rather than political. 
Robert Buijtenhuys, an expert on movements of political protest 
in Africa, describes them essentially as counter-cultures, which 
provide their followers "a place to feel at home".1 4. In the words 
of Sundkler, a pioneer in the field of African Independent 
churches, the Zion churches represent a tertium genus, an 
entirely new form of religious culture, different both from the 
white churches and African ancestral religion. 1 5 This cultural 
protest is directed not only against the real or supposed evil 
influences of white culture, but also against the dangers thought 
to be inherent in the ancestral African culture. As far as white 
culture is concerned it is particularly sexual promiscuity, drugs 
and criminality that are condemned, and with regard to African 
traditional culture, their main concern is with witchcraft and evil 
spirits. As they see it, the answer to all these problems is the 
creation of a new social and cultural environment in which a 
person can lead a life of purity. 
Two other factors, which are often mentioned as having 
contributed to the ZCC's attraction, are its pan-ethnic character 
to which we have already made reference, and what is referred 
to as its "particularly successful combination of Christianity and 
traditional culture". 1 6 The latter reason does not seem 
particularly illuminating, for which criteria does one use to 
describe the type of religious syncretism developed within the 
Z C C as "particularly successful"? It would seem that we are on 
somewhat safer ground, when we consider the ZCC's reputation in 
the labour market. Shop owners and factory managers prefer to 
employ Z C C members, because they are known as hard-working 
and honest, obedient, teetotallers, non-smokers, and above all 
people who come to their work on time and never go on strike. 
This work-ethic is kept alive by a tight social control, made 
possible by the fact that the Z C C followers in the various 
quarters of the black townships form a close-knit Community. 
The principal emblem of that Community is the small silver star 
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worn against a black cloth backdrop, which every member wears 
on his lapel. That star is a precious possession, because it makes 
him recognisable as a church member not only when applying for 
a job but also when looking for something to eat or a place to 
sleep. This is one of the chief reasons why the Z C C is so popular 
in urban areas and why it has almost as many men as women 
members, in contrast to other Zion churches where men usually 
form a distinct minority. 
Apart from this, the Church is also a prosperous enterprise 
in itself. It owns a large fleet of buses, which run on most of 
the routes in the African areas of the northern Transvaal. It also 
owns a shopping complex, a large saw-mill and vast tracts of 
land in the vicinity of Moria. On top of this the Z C C 
headquarters receives many donations from its members. On feast 
days large oil barrels are placed in front of the cathedral, where 
worshippers jostle to deposit their gifts. On the occasion of the 
Easter celebration of 1985 it was even said that the church 
received several million rand worth of donations from the 
faithful. A large portion of the money thus obtained is devoted 
to the church's welfare services aimed at assisting church 
members experiencing employment, financial or health problems 
{Sunday Times, Apr i l 14, 1985). 
The leaders of the church especially radiate great economic 
success. The founder, Engenas Lekganyane, used to make 
recruiting tours in a Rolls Royce. Edward, his son and successor, 
is said to have had forty-five cars, among which Cadillacs, 
Daimlers, a Buick, a Lincoln Continental and a big Mercedes 
Benz. The present bishop is somewhat less extravagant, but even 
he surrounds himself with symbols of opulence. Whatever 
outsiders may think of such luxuries, they are viewed by the 
faithful not only as symbols of the bishop's success but also of 
that of the church to which they belong. 
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The organisational structure of the Z C C 
While the reputation of the Z C C in the labour market and its 
own financial success have contributed considerably to its rapid 
growth, this does not tell us why the Z C C has remained virtually 
free of schisms. The church was founded by the present bishop's 
grandfather, Bishop Engenas Lekganyane, in 1910 (although there 
is uncertainty about that date). After his death in 1948 his two 
sons, Edward and Joseph, contested each other for the leadership. 
The conflict led to a split - Joseph renaming his faction St. 
Engenas Z C C , and Edward taking the bulk of his father's flock. 
As far as is known this has been the only occasion a split did 
occur. 
The principal reason for this relative absence of schisms 
seems to lie in the unique organisational structure of the Z C C , 
which is characterised by a stable balance between the autonomy 
of the local congregation and the centripetal attraction of the 
sacred centre, Moria. It is this which is considered the particular 
genius of the Z C C . 1 7 The church operates very much like a 
franchise system under which the proprietor of a large business 
chain allows an investor to operate an outlet for its products or 
services by using its chain name and management know-how. 
Generally speaking, the succes of a franchise system depends on 
the demand for, and the quality of its product, and the stability 
of its governing board to keep that demand going by means of 
intensive advertising and by disenfranchising those who fail to 
observe the chain's rules. 
Applied to the Z C C , we may say that the proprietor is the 
bishop and his council, the headquarters is Zion City Moria, the 
investors are the local congregations, and the products and 
services delivered by the headquarters are blessed articles, -the 
right to wear the Z C C name and paraphernalia and the right to 
call on the church in time of need. Under the Z C C franchise 
system, much depends on the fame of the sacred centre, Moria, 
which has been aptly described as "a graphic icon of the 
appropriation of the material and spiritual cargo of the 
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neocolonial System".18 Moria is the place where the bishop 
résides, where the vast cathedral stands, and the place to which 
three times every year pilgrims travel in their thousands. The 
bishop possesses the authority of a traditional chief, but he also 
fuif ils functions reminiscent of the traditional diviner and healer. 
Much like these traditional functionaries acted as the link 
between the community and the supernatural world, so the Z C C 
leader is the mediator between God and the members of the 
church. He communicates divine power and healing to his follo-
wers. 1 9 The vénération the Z C C members have for their bishop is 
virtually unbounded. He is the sacred symbol on which all the 
expectations of the Z C C followers converge. 
The bishop is assisted by a gênerai Council, which nowadays 
consists of twelve members. According to some commentators, 
among whom Arlene Getz of the Sunday Tribune (Apri l 14, 1985), 
the present bishop is essentially a figure-head, the "real work" 
being controlled by Emmanuel Matolla, the leader of the church's 
head-committee. It is true, Bishop Barnabas is not the 
flamboyant figure that his father was, but the qualification 
"figure-head" seems a misrepresentation not only of his person 
but also of his role. It would be more helpful to think of the 
bishop and the church's head committee in terms of a division of 
power. The bishop holds suprème spiritual power. The Council on 
the other hand may be seen as holding legislative and managerial 
power. These two types of power are interdependent. The Council 
dérives its power from the fact that it assists a person who is 
considered by millions as God's représentative on earth. It is to 
their advantage that the bishop's réputation as a great 
charismatic leader is maintained and constantly re-affirmed. On 
the other hand, it is in the interest of the bishop and the 
Lekganyane dynasty as a whole to have a Council which remains 
loyal under all circumstances. Briefly, the Council would have no 
power without the bishop, and the bishop would not be what he 
is now without the protection and advice from the Council. One 
has the impression that nowadays it is the Council which décides 
which of the sons is to be the present bishop's successor, and 
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that there is no répétition of a schism in the top of the 
organisation - as happened in 1947. 
Sécessions at the lower levels of the Z C C are well-nigh 
impossible because the one who secedes loses the considérable 
material and immaterial advantages that he dérives from the 
church. Of course, that would be the case also, i f he seceded 
from a church other than the Z C C . The différence, however, is 
that the Z C C is the first in terms of wealth, power and prestige, 
and that virtually all of that wealth, power and prestige is 
concentrated at headquarters. Few people would be willing to 
trade the glory of Moria and the prestige they get from the 
silver star for membership in a small, little-known church. 
The Z C C and the use of violence 
The journalist Allister Sparks, who visited the headquarters of 
the Z C C around Easter 1982 and who was received by some of 
the church's leading personalities, writes that on the walls of the 
room in which he was received were the portraits of South 
Africa's white political leaders and of the old Afrikaner heroes. 
On the table there was a replica of the Voortrekker Monument, 
which to black radicals is perhaps the most hated symbol of 
white domination (NRC/Handelsblad, May 24, 1982, translated 
from Natal Witness). The same source mentions that in 1965, 
when the minister of Bantu government paid a visit to the 
church, the famous "Bishop Eddie", father of the present bishop, 
thanked the minister for having led the black man to "orderly 
freedom", adding that "In our church there is no room for those 
who undermine national security and who trespass against the 
law". Sparks interprets this as testifying to "an enormous 
ambiguity", since in his view the Zion Churches on the one hand 
represent the resistance against the white domination in the 
churches - and in that sense constitute a massive independence 
movement - while on the other hand, they collaborate with the 
white state. Although Sparks' surprise is understandable, it only 
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shows that he is not aware of the différence between political 
and cultural protest. The Zion churches have no need to militate 
against apartheid. On the contrary, one has to see that they try 
to organise their own apartheid System under their own leaders, 
and that white apartheid is in a sense their natural ally. The 
Z C C went further in its collaboration with the white government 
because it was prodded to do so, its voice being more important 
than that of all the other independent churches combined. The 
church was rewarded for its dévotion by being one of the first 
black churches to receive official récognition by the state. 
Forty years ago, the first Afrikaner government could not 
make much use of the Zion churches, had it wanted to. They 
were simply too fragmented. T i l l about 1960 even the Z C C 
counted no more than 80.000 members. Its major expansion 
occurrec' only af ter 1960, in other words after Sharpeville. It was 
then that the A N C gave up its policy of non-violence, and the 
black townships became the foei of continuous unrest. In 1967, 
overall membership in the Z C C stood already at 200.000 at the 
most conservative estimate, and by now it stands at several 
million. There can be little doubt therefore that the explosive 
growth of the Z C C has been partly due to a désire on the part 
of a large section of South Africa's urban blacks to stem the tide 
of violence. Bishop Lekganyane said as much in his Easter 
address, when he mentioned that the remarkable expansion of his 
church was due to its message of non-violence. Although there is 
no reason to doubt the bishop's sincerity when proclaiming his 
faith in non-violence, it was a tragic error to invite Botha, 
thereby making himself and his church suspect in the eyes of the 
entire world. In August of the same year, the bishop still saw fit 
to argue that sanctions against South Africa were harmful only 
to the African population, and that those being in favour of them 
knew nothing about the South African situation. According to the 
bishop, there was much more goodwill between blacks and whites 
than was commonly thought, as shown by the grandiose welcome 
given to the state president on the occasion of the Easter 
célébration. 2 0 
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It was not before Easter 1986 that things began to change. 
According to a news item in The Citizen (Apri l 1, 1986) the 
bishop had denied that the minister of external affairs, Roelof 
("Pik") Botha had been invited to that year's Easter celebration, 
or that the event of the year before was meant to provide 
support for the state president. The bishop's statement was made 
after the Easter weekend of 1986, when the homes of some Z C C 
members who were attending the gathering at Moria had been 
burned down. The incident took place in the township of 
GaRankuwa, where a youth organisation had demanded that Z C C 
members stay home this Easter {Sunday Times, March 30, 1986). 
At almost the same time, sixteen people were killed and scores 
injured, when a passenger train carrying Z C C worshippers to 
Pietersburg was derailed in what was probably sabotage. A t 
Alexandra, Z C C members, returning from Moria were attacked. 
Earlier that week, there had been newspaper reports about 
threats of violence from political activists, who accused church 
members of not being "committed to the struggle for liberation in 
South Africa" (Star, March 29, 1986). It seemed as i f the good 
old days were over. 
Conclusion 
In this article we have tried to interpret the remarkable role 
played by the Zion Christian Church in South African politics. 
More particularly we have tried to make sense of the church's 
grandiose Easter celebration of 1985 to which it invited P.W. 
Botha, and which caused a great deal of surpise and anger inside 
and outside the Republic of South Africa. 
We have argued that part of the explanation is to be found 
in the fact that the Z C C puts so much emphasis on ritual 
healing. Churches engaging in that kind of activity are usually 
conservative, as testified to by the entire group of Zion churches 
in the country. Another suggestion has been that the Zion 
churches represent a version of Black Apartheid, whose origin 
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and development has to a considérable extent been stimulated by 
the System of White Apartheid. 
The Z C C was an interesting partner for the South African 
government, because of its large membership, and because it drew 
its members from all over the country. We have argued that this 
large membership was due, inter alia, to its pan-ethnic character, 
its position on the labour market and its freedom from 
sécessions. The latter characteristic has been attributed to its 
franchise-like organisation. Finally, the explosive expansion of 
the Z C C in the past quarter of a Century has also been 
attributed to the mounting spiral of violence in the black 
townships, the Z C C recruiting from among that section of the 
public which wanted to stem the tide of violence. 
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